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LAWLER, his wife,
Defendant .and Appellants.
.. ..
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Defendant and Cownterclaimant as
to Earl D. Tanner, arna Plaintiff
· against George Beckstead as Sheriff.
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of Salt Lake County, Utah,
Defendant in Intervention and
Respondent.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EARL D. TANNER,
Plailntiff and Respondent.
vs.
W. C. LAWLER and LAURA M.
LAWLER, his wife,
Defendant and Appellants.
vs.
WALTER H. REICHERT,
Defendant and Counterclaimant as
to Earl D. Tanner, arnd Plaintiff
against George Beckstead as Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah, and
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vs.
GEORGE .BECKSTEAD, as Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah,
Defendant in Intervention and
Respondent.

Case No. 8518
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PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In appellant's brief in support of their petition for
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rehearing they haye raised.seven points of alleged ·error.
It is the position of the _respondents that as to all of the
points raised in said p.et.itiop., save and except a portion
of Point One and)?oint )rive~ the matters presented arethose which wer~ argue~ in the briefs heretofore .filed
and require no f11rther discussion other than· a referen~,e.
to the arg·uments _set for~h -by these. resp~ndents in the·
Respondents Brief her.etofore filed herein~ The portion
of Point One :Qf.: appellant's... said brief to whieh thi~.
ans,vering brief is addressed re.ads ' ' The court erred .i.n
stating that the appellants have furnished a. stay bond
on the appeal, * * *" and the said Point Five reads as
follows ''The c~urt erred in holding that the appellants
gave a s·tay bond ~n order to retain. 'possession of the
property here ·involved.". .
. ...
:
~ehe pertinent facts are these : .On March 26,. 1956,

appellants filed the.~r no'tice qf_ appeal fron1 the judgrnent
belov1 (R. 93). ·The operative . po.rtiotl of said.r:totice reads
as follows:
''You and ea·ch of you will take· notice that
W. C. Lawler· and Laura ·M. Lawler, ·his wife,
defendants above named, and Walter H. R~iche·r.t
defendant and counterclaimant as to Earl D.·
Tanner ·and plaintiff against George~ Beckstead,
as Sheriff of Salt Lake County., Utah,. above
named, hereby appeal .to .the Supreme c·9urt of
the State of Utah from a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, Earl D. Tanner and defendant in
intervention, George Beckstead as Sheriff of Salt
Lake County, Utah, which judgment was entered
in this action · o nthe .17th day . of March, 1956.
This appeal is ·t-aken from. the whole of said judg.ment." (Italics added.)
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On the same day and, presumably, at the same time,
two bonds were filed by appellants. The first of said
bonds was denominated a ''Cost Bond on Appeal,'' was
in the amount of $300.00 and wa.s filed on behalf of all
three appellants, Walter H. Reichert, W. C. Lawler and
Laura M. ·Lawler. The second bond was denominated
''Supersedeas Bond on Appeal.'' Both bonds were submitted to the trial court and were approved by Judge
David T. Lewis in an ex parte examination of said bonds.
A notation of approval is found in the upper left-hand
corner of each bond (R. 96 and 98). Said Supersedeas
Bond reads as follows :

"KNOW ALL }fEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we, Julius C. Reichert and Sylvia
Reichert, both of Salt Lake City, Utah, are held
and firmly bound unto EARL D. TANNER in the
sum of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00), to ·be p·aid unto the said EARL D. TANNER, his executors, administrators or assigns,
to which payment \vell and truly to be made we
bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators firmly by these presents.
"WITNESS our hands this 24th day of
Mar·ch, 1956.
''The condition of the above obligation is such
that whereas on the 17th day of M-arch, 1956, a
judgment in the sutn of $500.00 and costs was
rendered against Walter Reichert and in favor of
Ear1 D. T-anner in a certa.in action in the Third
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, which
aetion is nu1nbered 107508 and entitled, ·Earl D.
'fanner, Plaintiff, vs. \\r. C. La"rler, Laura M.
I.Jawler, his wife, Defendants, vs. '':alter H. Reichert, Defendant and Countere.Ian1ant a.s to Earl D.
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Tanner and Plaintiff ~against George Beckstead,
as Sheriff of Salt I..~ake County, Utah, vs. George
Beckstead, as Sheriff of Salt Lake County Utah,
Defendant in Intervention~ and
''WHEREAS, the said Walter Reichert is
about to appeal to the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah from the judgment so rendered against
him; and
"WHEREAS, the said Walter H. Reichert
desires to stay execution upon said judgment
pending the appeal;
''N,OW, THEREFORE, if the said judgment
is affirmed or the appeal dismissed, then and in
such ~case the said Walter H. Reichert will pay
in full the amount of said judgment and costs,
interest and damages for delay, then and in such
case this undertaking shall become null and void,
otherwise to remain in full force and effect.
''The undersigned hereby submit himself and
herself to the jurisdiction of the Third District
Court of Salt Lake County and irrevocably appoint the Clerk of the Court as his and her agent
upon whom any papers affecting his or her
liability may be enfor.ced on motion without the
necessity of an independent action.''
At all times during the course of this .appeal Elias
Hansen has been the attorney, and the sole attorney,
for ail three of the appellants.
The following statements, though true, do not appeae
in the re·cord of this action. Since th~y Bear·
the subject of this brief and there has been no 'bccasion for setting them forth heretofore, it is the view of respondents
that these allegations should be placed before this c'Ourt

on
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in order to aid in its interpretation. If the court feels
that they are of no significance, even if assumed to be
true, it will not be necessary to have them examined by
a trier of facts. If, on the other hand, this court deems
them to be of significance, if true, an examination of
their verity by a trier of facts may be in order.
At or about the time of the filing of the aforementioned notice of appeal and bonds, plaintiff telephoned
the attorney for the three appellants and requested that
some mutually agreeable arrangements be made for the
restitution of the premises to his possession in compliance with the judgment as to which said attorney had
indicated an intent so to appeal. Said attorney advised
the pl~aintiff that in no event would arrangements be
made to restore said property to his possession or to provide that the rentals being paid under contract to the appellant Reichert by the appellant Lawlers be paid, during
the course of said proposed appeal, to plaintiff rather
than Reichert. Said attorney advised plaintiff that he
was not entitled to possession during the appeal period,
and, were he to atteu1pt to secure possession during that
period it would be \vrongful and he would be· required
to defend an action for a very substantial sun1 of n1oney
for dispossessing ap·pellants.

I11 light of this threat and of appellants fir1n statenlent that possession \Vas to be 1naintained during the
appeal period, the plaintiff, upon receipt of notice of
appeal, exanlined the two bonds filed herein and, in an
ex partp eon l'PreneP~ askPd the trial court~ 'vhich had
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approved said bonds in an ex parte conference with appellants' counsel, whether it was the intent of the court
when it approved said bond, that the supersedeas bond
operate to stay the whole of the judgment appealed
from by Reichert. Plaintiff was advised that that ~vas the
understanding of the s.aid court "rhen it approved said
bond. Plaintiff then advised the court that, in view of the
representations made to p}aintiff by counsel for appellant
Reichert as to s-aid _appellant's s.ubstantial financial
capacity and in· view of the fact that the $9,078.81 paid
to the sheriff for· said appellant was held by the sheriff
and refused by said appellant and would be so ·held
pending the appeal, plaintiff waived any objection to
the amount of the supersedeas bond.
Respondent Tanner made no further effort to secure
the possession of said premises and ha.s been out of their
possession up to and including the :present time. During
a portion of the period of the appeal, respondents Lawlers have been in possession of the. premises as tenants
of respondent Reichert under a written contract requiring them to pay the said Reichert rentals of $75.00 per
n1onth. Respondent T.anner believes and alleges that
appellants I.Javvlers have continued after the expiration
of said written rental agreement to :possess said premises
as the tenants of said appellant Reichert. Whether
rentals have been paid from the

]~awlers

to Reichert

under this arrangement has not yet been determined by
any court.
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It was stipulated between the parties here (R. 62)
that appellant Reichert was the person in possession of
the disputed premises and that he maintained his possession through the appellants Lawlers. This was found
to be the fact and judgment was rendered accordingly.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN STATING THAT REICHERT HAS DEP·OSITED A STAY BOND IN ORDER FOR
THE LAWLERS TO RETAIN PO·SSE.SSION OF THE PROPERTY PENDING THE APPEAL.
ARGU~IENT

This court, with a ·clear insight into the actual results
of the facts shown by the record, made the follo,ving
statement under Point (4) of the majority opinion:
"Here it is evident that the money judgment
against the Lawlers is not collectable. There are
liens for more than $7,000.00 .against any interest
they may have in real property in this county and
the mortgage foreclosure judgment was allowed to
go to sale. R-eichert has deposited a stay ·bond
in order for the Lawlers to retain possession of
the property pending the appeal but no such bond
'vas deposited for the La"Tlers. If a money judgment is awarded only against the La-w"lers then
Reichert's stay bond will have the effect of preventing Tanner fro1n obtaining possession of the
property pending this appeal but he will be unable
to .collect from such bond the judgment against
Lawlers, although as Reichert's tenants the Lawlers may voluntarily· pay him the rental value of
the property during that. tin1e. ''
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Since Reichert was maintaining his possession of the
disputed premises through tenants who were, for this
purpose, actually tenant-agents, a dispossession of the
Lawlers would have been a dispossession of Reichert.
If the supersedeas bond is to be held to have the effect
which it has been accorded by the conduct of all of the
parties to this action, to-wit, a stay of restitution, a dis-

possession of Reichert by the dispossession of his tenantagents, would have been wrongful and would have subjected both the sheriff and Tanner to damages. That
Reichert so interpreted the situation is clear from his
conduct and warning.
The body of the supersedeas bond contains ina-ccuracies and ambiguities. Given one construction, the operative portion of said bond would have the effect of staying
enfor·cement of such portion of the judgment as was
being appealed from, and, given a different interpretation, would stay only the money judgment. The burden
of that uncertainty must be borne by the party furnishing the bond for approval and acting under the bond to
retain possession of the premises for the whole period
of the appeal. Approval of the bond

supe~rseded

and

set at naught the whole of the judgment against Reichert.
The question now before this court is whether it can be
held, in light of the facts of the case that the ''supersedeas ·bond'' furnished as such and so denominated by
appellant Reichert, viewed in light of the surrounding
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circumstanees and his continued possession of the premises, can be said not to have been dep·osited in order
to keep Tanner from the possession of the premises and
can he held not to have kept Tanner from said possession.
Rule 73 (d) U. R. C. P. p:rovides for the furnishing of
a supersedeas bond. This rule must be read in conjunCtion with the provisions of Rule 62 U. R. C. P .. Said Rule
73 ( d) is verba tim with Rule 73 (d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure except for the use of the word
"sheriff" in p·1ace of the word "marshal." It provides
as follows:
''SUPERSEDEAS BOND. Whenever an appellant entitled thereto desires a stay on appeal,
he may present to the court for its approval a
supersedeas bond "~hich shall have such surety
or sureties as the court requires. The bond shall
be conditioned for the satisfaction of the judglnent in full together with .c-osts, interest, and damages f.or delay, if for any reason the appeal is
dismissed or if the judgn1ent is affirmed, and
to satisfy in full such modification of the judgInent and su.ch costs, interest, and damages as the
appellate court 1nay adjudge and a''yard. \\~hen
the judgn1ent is for the recovery of money not
other,;rise secured, the an1ount of the bond shall
be fixed at such smn as will cover the "'.,.hole
antount of the judg1nent remaining unsatisfied,
costs on the appeal, interest, and damages for delay, unless the court after notice and hearing and
for good {~ause show,.n fixes _a. different a1nount
or orders secutity other than the bond. \Y.hen
the judgn1ent deter1nines the disposition of thr
property in controver8y as in real actions, replevin, and actions to foreclose mortgag~es or when
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such property is in the custody of the sheriff or
when the proceeds of such property or a bond for
its value is in the custody or ·Control of the court,
the amount of the supersedeas bond shall be fixed
at such sum only a.s will secure the amount recovered for the use and detention of the property,
the costs of the action, costs on appeal, interest,
and damages for delay.''
The effect of a supersedeas bond in the state of
Utah has been settled by this court in the case of
Smith vs. Kimball, 70 A.L.R. 101, 76 U. 350, 289 P. 588,
which holds as follows :
''The judgment in the main action, from
which the appeal was taken and which was superseded, was, in legal effect by the appeal and supersedeas, vacated and rendered inoperative, the authority of the court below terminated and prevented from further proceeding with respect to
any matter involved in the subject-matter of the
appeal, or to take any action which amounted to
an execution or enforcement of the judgment, ·or
which affect~d the subject-matter of the appeal,
and the case left with all its incidents precisely
as it stood before the rendition of the judgment
in the court below and became one of cognizan,ce
in this court on a trial de novo on the record;
and, though the judgment in the district court was
final judgment for purposes of the appeal, yet,
because of the appeal and the supersedeas, was
not a final determination of the rights of the
parties in and to the subject-matter of the litigation, until a determination by this court." (Citing
statute and cases.)
In that case, however, the court stated that "Neither
the form or the sufficiency of the supersedeas to operate
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as a full and ·complete stay is qu,estion·ed. '' For this
reas1on said case cannot be held to be determinative of
the issues in the present case, but the rule as to the effect
of the supersedeas is important.
As is set forth in Volume 7, Moore's F.ederal Practice, 2nd edition at Page 1370, in a discussion of Rule
62 (d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which is the
same as Rule 62 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), it is ·pointed out that the stay is effective when the
superse.de.as bond is app'roved by the court and that
execution issued thereafter is wholly irregular and may
be quashed either in the court below or by the court of
review. Four opinions of the United States Supreme
Court are cited by Moore to this effect. Since it is not
anticipated that thi~ proposition is controverted, said
citations will not be repeated here.
The supersedeas bond filed herein is composed of
two parts, the recitals and the operative portion. The
first recital refers to the judgment ''rendered against
Walter Reichert and in favor of Earl D. Tanner in a
certain action in the Third District Court of Salt Lake
(jounty, lTtah which action is numbered 107508 and entitled 'Earl D. Tanner, plaintiff, Ys W. C. La"rler, Laura
M. I.Ja~rler, his ~rife, defendants, vs. "\"\.,..alter H. Reichert,
defendant and counterelai1nant as to Earl D. Tanner * * *.' '' It characterizes said judgment as being a
jndgn1e11t in the sum of $500.00 and costs. This characterization ifi in error for the rea$on that the judgment
there rei'Prred to (a11d appealed fron1), is a judgment
in the ~urn of $500.00 and co~ts and restit11tion.
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The next recital states that the said Walter H. Reichert is about to appeal to the Supreme Court of th·e
State of Utah from· the judgment so rendered against
him and the next recital states that said Walter H.
Reichert desires to stay execution upon said judgment
pending the appeal. The judgment referred to, appealed
from, and stayed, is the judgment for restitution as well
as damages.
The operative portion of said supersedeas bond
reads as follows :
"Now, therefore, if the said judgment is
affirmed or the appeal dismissed, then and in such
case the said Walter H. Reichert will pay in full
the amount of said judgment and costs, interest
and damages for delay, then and in such case this
undertaking shall ·become null and void, otherwise
to remain in full force and effect.''
It is the contention of the respondent Tanner that
the operative portion of said supersedeas bond controls,
and when approved, stays the whole judgrnent app.ealed
from, was understood by all partie·s to this action to he
controlling, was treated and acted upon by all parties
as controlling, and as having the effect of staying the
entire judgment insofar as Reichert was concerned. Had
Reichert intended to stay only the money judgment he
eould easily have said in the bond ''only the money
judgment is to be stayed."
The essential elements of an effective supersedeas
bond are set forth in Moore's Federal Practice, 2nd
Edition, Volume 7 at Page 3175 as follows:
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''A supersedeas bond must be ·conditioned (1)
for the satisfaction of the judgment in full to-;
gether with costs, (2). interest and·. (3) damages
for delay, if for any. reason the aprpeaJ is d1s-·
mis:sed or if the judgmentis affirmed, and {4)to~
satisfy in full such modification of the judgment
and such costs, interest, and dawages as the appellant court niay adjudge and aw:ard."

It is apparent from the operative portion of the
supersedeas bond se( forth above that these conditions
were fully met, and~- th.at the judgment against Reichert
was thereafter, as a matter .of law, superseded and enforcement stayed.
It was \Vi thin the po,ver of the appellailt Reichert to .
clearly state that the judgn1ent conce~p.ed in the super~- ·
sedeas bond was the money .judgn1ent only, if t~at was·
his intent, and not to ·furnish a bond which, from. ·the
operative portion of it, ronstrued togethe-r "'ith the
notice of appeal, would appear to b~·ing into operation ·
the legal effect set forth in S·ntith VS.,.Kinlba-l!, supra,
to the ""rhole ·of -'the .judg1nent ·against Re~c~1ert.
.

'

.

.

·~

as

It has bern argued tliat. ·t.he amount of the bond is
of so1ne signifi.c~anee. If this regard it shoul-Q. be noted
that a $300.00 bond \va~ filed and that the -supersedea~
bond, being· in addition to the cost bond, \Vas in .an a1nount
\vhieh could, in vie'v of the aceelerated a•ppeal provision3
in thi~ kind
Ca8e, be expected to_ COYer damages 011
appeal in event treble da1nages 'vere disallowed.· In addition it 1nust be considered that the smn of $9,078.81 was
still on dPposit \vith th(l sheriff and subject to being used
to satiRfy any judp;n1ent ag~ainst the appellant Reichert

of
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herein. The waiver by the respondent Tanner of a challenge to the sufficiency of the amo111nt of the bond should
not be held to constitute a waiver as to the sufficiency
of its effect. That he construed the bond to have the
effect of staying restitution cannot be doubted, for he
made no further effort to obtain restitution of the premises after the telephone conversation with respondant.s'
counsel, the bond, and the ex parte discussion with the
court which had approved the bond ex parte.
In the event this court feels that said bond did not
have the effect of staying proces-s to obtain possession
of the premises by a writ of restitution, it must inquire
whether the a;ppellant R.eichert has waived or is estopped
from claiming that the bond has limited application.
Presumably these determinations would require an additional hearing. Such a hearing could establish whether
the Lawlers have paid rent to Reichert during the period
of appeal or during any portion of said period, and
could fix damages for withholding possession from Tanner both as to loss of use and as to property damage.
If it be held that said bond did not stay Tanner from
repossession of the premises during the appeal, said
additional hearing could provide for a determination
as to who is obligated to pay the fair value of the use
of the premises during the period of the appeal. Certainly, under the circumstances of this case, Tanner
should not in any event be wholly deprived of the value
of the use of the premises during the period of the
appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above the respondents
respectfully urge this court to deny the p,e tition for
re'h earing filed hereby by the appellants. The original
desision of this court as reported is accurate, just, and
proper in ·each and every respect.
Resp~ectfully

submitted,

EARL D. TANNER
Attorney for Respondent
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